The sounds that make up spoken words are heard in a series and must be mapped rapidly onto words in memory because their elements, unlike those of visual words, cannot simultaneously exist or persist in time. Although theories agree that the dynamics of spoken word recognition are important, they differ in how they treat the nature of the competitor set—precisely which words are activated as an auditory word form unfolds in real time. This study used eye tracking to measure the (...) impact over time of word frequency and 2 partially overlapping competitor set definitions: onset density and neighborhood density. Time course measures revealed early and continuous effects of frequency (facilitatory) and on set based similarity (inhibitory). Neighborhood density appears to have early facilitatory effects and late inhibitory effects. The late inhibitory effects are due to differences in the temporal distribution of similarity within neighborhoods. The early facilitatory effects are due to subphonemic cues that inform the listener about word length before the entire word is heard. The results support a new conception of lexical competition neighborhoods in which recognition occurs against a background of activated competitors that changes over time based on fine-grained goodness-of-fit and competition dynamics. (shrink)

The strange story of the von Neumann impossibility proof is recalled, and the even stranger story of later impossibility proofs, and how the impossible was done by de Broglie and Bohm. Morals are drawn.

Introduction to one of the most important, controversial, and suggestive works of moral philosophy ever written.

Supertasks recently discussed in the literature purport to display a failure ofenergy conservation and determinism in Newtonian mechanics. We debatewhether these supertasks are admissible as Newtonian systems, with Earmanand Norton defending the affirmative and Alper and Bridger the negative.

This comprehensive and important volume includes contributions by activists, journalists, lawyers and scholars from twenty-one countries. The essays map the directions the movement for women's rights is taking--and will take in the coming decades--and the concomittant transformation of prevailing notions of rights and issues. They address topics such as the rapes in former Yugoslavia and efforts to see that a War Crimes Tribunal responds; domestic violence; trafficking of women into the sex trade; the persecution of lesbians; female genital mutilation; and (...) reproductive rights. (shrink)

For some time, philosophers have sought a more satisfactory understanding of the mysteries of morality through a close analysis of its assumed kinship with practical rationality, via the psychological capacity of choice. It is the view in the present paper that no such understanding is possible by these means. The significance of morality has nothing to do with choice.

This volume -- a companion to Thomas Reid: Selected Philosophical Writings (2012) -- makes available material from Thomas Reid's autograph manuscripts and student notes of his lectures. It includes an introductory essay by Nicholas Wolterstorff.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Blossoming of Bioethics at NIHEzekiel J. Emanuel (bio)The establishment of the Department of Clinical Bioethics at the Warren G. Magnuson Clinical Center of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) has coincided with a burgeoning of interest and activity related to bioethical issues at NIH. The department has precipitated a reexamination and revitalization of existing bioethics activities in the Clinical Center and has launched new programs especially in (...) the areas of education and research. In addition, the department contributes to the work of others throughout NIH who address bioethical issues.The Organizational Location of the Department of Clinical BioethicsBefore describing the history and current activities of the Department of Clinical Bioethics, I will say something about it administrative location. Comprehension of the department’s organizational location is essential to understanding its history, role, and function. Prior to interviewing for the position of chair of the department, I did not—and, if truth be told, still do not fully—understand the details of the organizational structure of NIH. I therefore assume that many other bioethicists outside of the Institutes, especially those who do not regularly receive NIH funding, may not fully grasp its organizational intricacies.The Department of Clinical Bioethics is a department within the Warren G. Magnuson Clinical Center, which is NIH’s “hospital.” Hospital is in quotes because all of the patients at the Clinical Center must be enrolled in a research protocol and, therefore, are research subjects. The Clinical Center is where NIH’s clinical researchers admit their research subjects or see them in the out-patient setting. The Department of Clinical Bioethics reports directly to the Director of the Clinical Center, John I. Gallin, M.D., and receives its finances, space, and other resources from the Clinical Center.In this way, the department is part of NIH’s intramural (“inside”) program. People employed by NIH conduct intramural research, training, and other initiatives. The extramural program, which receives approximately 87 percent of NIH’s budget, funds research at institutions outside NIH. The extramural program awards grants and contracts for research, training, and conferences conducted [End Page 455] by investigators who are not affiliated with NIH. The National Human Genome Research Institute’s ELSI (Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications) program, for example, is part of NIH’s extramural program. As part of the NIH intramural program, the Department of Clinical Bioethics is not empowered to fund independent initiatives of people outside of NIH through grants and contracts. However, the department can collaborate with bioethicists and others on research, educational, and other programs outside of NIH and has some funds to support these collaborations.In addition, it is important for bioethicists to understand that NIH is a collection of 24 institutes and centers. Although there is coordination and collaboration between the institutes and centers, each is funded separately, and each has its own scope, programs, administrative structures, research agendas, training priorities, boards of advisors, and so forth. In this sense, NIH is more like a university that has many distinct schools, each with its own dean, faculty, budget, and fund raising office, than one that is tightly integrated and centrally-administered. Within NIH’s diffuse administrative structure, the Department of Clinical Bioethics is located within one of the centers (the Clinical Center) and has defined authority and responsibility only for bioethics within that center; in addition, because the Clinical Center’s mission is to support clinical research at other institutes, the department’ mission includes supporting the work of those institutes as well. Intellectual exchanges and relationships with other institutes and centers are neither pre-ordained nor administratively established; such relationships must be developed case-by-case, topic-by-topic, and initiative-by-initiative.The History and the Development of the Department of Clinical BioethicsThe Department of Clinical Bioethics was launched in late 1996. Although the department’s creation marked a major commitment to bioethics by the Clinical Center, and especially by its director, Dr. Gallin, it was formed on a pre-existing foundation of bioethics activities at NIH. 1In 1977, John Fletcher, Ph.D., was appointed by then Director Mortimer Lipsett as the bioethicist at the Clinical Center; his official title was Assistant for Bioethics... (shrink)

The current study collected orally-delivered autobiographical narratives from a sample of 44 undergraduate students. Participants were asked to produce both deceptive and non-deceptive versions of their narrative to two specific autobiographical question prompts while standing in front of a video camera. Narratives were then analyzed with Coh-Metrix software on 33 indices of linguistic cohesion. Following a Bonferroni correction for the large number of linguistic variables , results indicated that the deceptive narratives contained more explicit action verbs, less linguistic complexity, and (...) less referential coherence . The results support a theory that, in deceptive narratives, there is greater narrative distance between the self that narrates and the self that is narrated about. This suggests that narrative selves are constituted not as autonomous selves, but are subject to processes that are likely operating on a subconscious level. (shrink)

Fowlie portrays Claudel as a versatile spirit, synthesizing his interests in politics and art in his religious concern. Especially interesting are the remarks on Claudel's theories of art, in which the religious poet particularly functions as the interpreter of a deeper imaginative self. Fowlie's criticism of the poems and plays throws welcome light on works whose meaning is not easily made luminous.--A. J. S.

Discovering obligations that are ascribed to them by others is potentially an important element in the development of the moral imagination of engineers. Moral imagination cannot reasonably be developed by contemplating oneself and one’s task alone: there must be some element of discovering the expectations of people one could put at risk. In practice it may be impossible to meet ascribed obligations if they are completely general and allow no exceptions — for example if they demand an unlimited duty to (...) avoid harm. But they can still serve to modify engineers’ prior ethics, for example by limiting a purely utilitarian approach to deciding who should bear risk and how much risk they should bear. Ascribed obligations can also give engineers insight into the public reaction to risks that arise from engineered systems, and the consequent expectations that the public have about how much protection is desirable and where the responsibility for this protection lies. This article analyses the case for taking ascribed obligations seriously, and reviews some of the obligations that have been ascribed in the aftermath of recent engineering failures. It also proposes ways in which ascribed obligations could be used in engineers’ moral development. (shrink)

Since the publication of his Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein's work has acquired a dubious patina of commentary which makes it appear that he was, without question, a verificationist. A. J. Ayer concludes his criticism of Wittgenstein by holding that descriptive statements need not be “directly verifiable by me.” In his reply to Ayer, R. Rhees only reinforces this view of Wittgenstein as a verificationist by holding that he thought it essential to the significant use of a word that it could be (...) used both rightly and wrongly. If there is no distinction between correct and incorrect in what I say, then “of course … I say nothing” according to Rhees, who thinks he is speaking for Wittgenstein. Norman Malcolm also subscribes to this reading of the Philosophical Investigations. Without the idea of a verifiably correct use, he insists, there can be no idea of a language. (shrink)